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Abstract 
 Many languages assign nouns to a grammatical gender class, such that ‘bed’ might be 
assigned masculine gender in one language (e.g. Italian) but feminine gender in another (e.g. 
Spanish). In the context of research assessing the potential for language to influence thought 
(the linguistic relativity hypothesis), a number of scholars have investigated whether 
grammatical gender assignment ‘rubs off’ on concepts themselves, such that Italian speakers 
might conceptualise beds as more masculine than Spanish speakers. We systematically 
reviewed 43 pieces of empirical research examining grammatical gender and thought, which 
together tested 5,895 participants. We classified the findings in terms of their support for this 
hypothesis, and assessed the results against parameters previously identified as potentially 
influencing outcomes. Overall, we found that support was strongly task- and context-
dependent, and rested heavily on outcomes that have clear and equally-viable alternative 
explanations. We also argue that it remains unclear whether grammatical gender is in fact a 
useful tool for investigating relativity. 
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1. Introduction 
The Sapir-Whorf or linguistic relativity hypothesis—henceforth ‘Relativity’ (Whorf, 
1956)—takes various forms, but at its heart it contends that the idiosyncrasies of the 
languages we speak influence the way we think about the world. In its strongest 
incarnation—linguistic determinism—thought is constrained by language, but few if any 
contemporary scholars take this view (Athanasopoulos, 2009). At the opposite extreme is the 
‘universalist’ position, in which thought is said to be independent of language (e.g., Pinker, 
1994; See Lucy, 2016, for a historical overview). Although there is no agreement as to where 
between these two opposing views the truth is situated, there is broad consensus that neither 
extreme is correct (Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013). In the middle are a variety of standpoints; 
some more limiting of the role of language than others. For example, thinking for language 
(i.e. thinking about speaking) might allow language to bias our attention towards the more 
linguistically-describable aspects of what we perceive (Slobin, 1996), but this does not mean 
that language alters underlying conceptual structures. Another standpoint is that language can 
influence our judgments about what we perceive, but not perception itself, which is 
cognitively impenetrable (see Firestone & Scholl, 2016for debate; Pylyshyn, 1984). For 
many, our perceptions are perhaps best described as modulated or biased by language 
(Athanasopoulos, 2006; Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid, & Casasanto, 2013; Gilbert, Regier, Kay, 
& Ivry, 2006, 2008; Lupyan, 2012). Overall, investigating the ways in which language does 
and does not relate to thought now appears to be the prevailing approach (Lucy, 2016; 
Lupyan, 2012; Thierry, 2016).  
Evidence for language influencing thought and judgments about perceptions comes 
from various domains. For example, performance on colour discrimination/matching tasks 
has been shown to be more efficient when the stimuli have different labels in a participant’s 
language relative to when they are subsumed under one term (e.g. Roberson, Pak, & Hanley, 
 4 
2008; Winawer et al., 2007). Differences between languages have also been demonstrated to 
affect how people think about object relations (Park & Ziegler, 2014) and objects themselves 
(Imai & Gentner, 1997) as well as broader, more abstract concepts such as quantity 
(Athanasopoulos, 2006), time (Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto et al., 2004) and motion 
(Athanasopoulos & Bylund, 2013). Some of these studies have generated vigorous debate, 
perhaps most notably in the area of colour perception (e.g., A. Brown, Lindsey, & Guckes, 
2011; Franklin, Clifford, Williamson, & Davies, 2005; Witzel & Gegenfurtner, 2013). For 
some, aspects of grammar might provide a better tool by which Relativity can be explored 
than vision-focussed research; this is because grammar is unaffected by sensory input, 
obviating the need for language to ‘breach’ psychophysical barriers. Additionally, for the 
Relativity hypothesis to hold it should not be limited to category labels but extend to features 
of syntax too (Sato & Athanasopoulos, 2018).  
One aspect of grammar that has received attention in recent years is grammatical 
gender (Bassetti & Nicoladis, 2016; Bender, Beller, & Klauer, 2018). Unlike English, which 
has a semantic (or conceptual) gender system, whereby the gender of a noun is dictated by its 
biological sex, many languages have a formal system by which all nouns are assigned to a 
grammatical gender category whether they have biological sex or not. For example, the 
English word ‘bed’ has no gender, and is referred to with the pronoun ‘it’, but in Italian (ilm 
letto) takes the masculine gender. The consequence of a formal grammatical gender system is 
obligatory conformity or agreement with the syntactic rules of that class. This may involve 
marking for gender any definite or indefinite articles (‘the’, ‘a/an’), plural markings, case 
markings, and other forms of agreement. Different languages also assign different genders to 
the same objects; for example, in contrast to Italian, ‘bed’ takes feminine grammatical gender 
in Spanish (laf cama). Such differences are not at all exceptional; grammatical gender 
assignment in a given language is largely arbitrary (Corbett, 1991; Foundalis, 2002), and 
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‘escapes logic’ (Boutonnet, Athanasopoulos, & Thierry, 2012). Indeed, as English and other 
languages with purely semantic gender show, a formal grammatical gender system is also 
unnecessary when it comes to the communicative function of a language.  
The crucial exception to arbitrariness in grammatical gender assignment concerns 
words referring to entities, usually human, with actual biological sex. ‘Woman’ is feminine 
and ‘man’ masculine across German, French, Italian and Spanish, and it is from these 
associations, presumably1, that grammatical ‘gender’ receives its name. Occasionally, the 
correlation between grammatical gender and biological sex is imperfect; witness German, 
which has a third, neuter gender category in addition to masculine and feminine, and which 
assigns this gender to the word  for ‘girl’ (dasn Mädchen). Nevertheless, even in German the 
vast majority of words referring to humans which have biological sex show a strong pattern 
of masculine with males and feminine with females. In this sense, languages with a formal 
gender system can be viewed as having a largely semantic gender system for human agents at 
least. 
It is the combination of the arbitrariness of grammatical gender assignment and the 
link with biological sex that has attracted researchers to grammatical gender when examining 
Relativity (e.g. Bassetti, 2007; Sato & Athanasopoulos, 2018). The question asked in such 
studies is whether grammatical gender assignment ‘rubs off’ on the conceptual 
representations of inanimate objects that have no biological sex such that, for example, Italian 
speakers conceptualise beds as somehow more masculine than speakers of a language with no 
formal grammatical gender system, or than speakers with a gender system but for whom a 
different gender is assigned. Although historically seen as a ‘quirk’ of grammar, grammatical 
gender is therefore regarded to be in a particularly strong position to inform long-standing 
                                               
1 We return to this issue and discuss it in greater detail in the Discussion section. 
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philosophical, linguistic and psychological debates around the universality or otherwise of 
human thought (Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003).  
A variety of tasks have been employed to understand whether grammatical gender 
does influence concepts. The most common has been the Voice Choice task (sixteen different 
publications using this task were discovered in this review), in which participants are asked to 
assign a male or female voice to objects, with many finding that the sex of the voice and 
grammatical gender of the target are indeed broadly consistent (e.g. Kurinski, Jambor, & 
Sera, 2016; Lambelet, 2016; Ramos & Roberson, 2011; Sera, Berge, & del Castillo Pintado, 
1994; Sera et al., 2002). Similar results have been found when asking participants to assign a 
human name or a sex to an object ('Sex Assignment' tasks, e.g., Belacchi & Cubelli, 2012; 
Flaherty, 2001), and when asking participants to rate on a scale the similarity (‘Similarity 
Task’) between pictures of male and female humans and objects (Phillips & Boroditsky, 
2003). In Object-Name Memory Association tasks participants are instructed to remember 
male and female names that substitute object names, such that ‘chair’ might now be 
‘Patricia’, and results have sometimes shown that the ability to recall the human name is 
enhanced if it is congruent with the grammatical gender of the object in question (Boroditsky 
& Schmidt, 2000). 
The tasks described above all involve judgments made without time pressure or 
measurement, but there is also some, albeit limited evidence in favour of grammatical gender 
influencing concepts from speeded-response tasks. Converging evidence from different 
measurement types is important to generate the clearest picture possible of any effect. For 
example, in the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (‘EAST’), participants respond to words 
using two keys; in one condition, each key is mapped to a colour, and in another each key is 
mapped to a sex (male or female). Bender, Beller, and Klauer (2016b) found that German 
speakers were faster to respond to the colour of a word if that word was a gendered, 
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personifiable noun (e.g., death, beauty) and the response key was also mapped to the sex 
implied by the target’s grammatical gender. However, they also found that the effect was 
weak or non-existent for inanimate objects, and only held for personifiable nouns that had 
connotations of sex that were themselves congruent with the noun’s grammatical gender 
(e.g., ‘war’ is masculine in connotation and gender, but ‘Spring’ is feminine in connotation 
but masculine in gender).  
The role of gender or sex in the tasks so far described is clear, as participants are 
making judgments and responses with biological sex playing an obvious role in this process. 
Some researchers have preferred tasks where the salience of sex and gender can be reduced 
or made more orthogonal to the participant’s conscious experience. For example, Konishi 
(1993) employed a Property Judgment paradigm, finding that German speakers rated 
masculine-gendered objects such as ‘key’, ‘table’ and ‘beach’ as more ‘potent’ (a trait 
associated with masculinity) than concepts with feminine gender; Spanish speakers for whom 
the same targets took the feminine gender rated the same items less potent. This type of task 
makes participants think about concepts without having to relate them to gender or sex 
directly; indeed, neither term needs to come up in the instructions to such experiments at all. 
Other studies, often using the same or similar designs, as those described above have 
instead reported potentially important absences of evidence. For example, in a Properties 
Judgment task, Landor (2014) asked approximately 600 speakers of gendered languages to 
generate adjectives to describe inanimate objects, and then asked a different group of 
participants to assign a male or female voice to them. Cross-referencing these results back to 
the original stimuli, no evidence of property judgments consistent with grammatical gender 
was found. Absences of evidence have also been reported in Sex Assignment tasks (Nicoladis 
& Foursha-Stevenson, 2012), Similarity tasks (Degani, 2007), the EAST (Bender et al., 
2018), and Priming-type tasks (e.g. Degani, 2007; Samuel, Roehr-Brackin, & Roberson, 
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2016). The importance of these findings is that they might delineate important constraints on 
the Relativity hypothesis which, as discussed earlier, would be a finding consistent with the 
majority of theoretical standpoints in the contemporary literature. 
Further clarifications of such constraints might come from results that do not conform 
to a binary ‘support or no-support’ distinction. For example, a Property Judgment task by 
Semenuks, Phillips, Dalca, Kim, and Boroditsky (2017) found that grammatical gender 
influenced property judgments but only in an analysis that left out participants’ first-choice 
adjectives, focussing on second- and third-choice adjectives alone. The authors suggest that 
the absence of an effect from the first adjective choice might explain the tendency for more 
negative findings from speeded-response tasks, but an alternative explanation is that 
participants fell back on grammatical gender as a strategy after they had made their initial and 
potentially most faithful descriptions (cf. Bender, Beller, & Klauer, 2016a). 
Other studies find support for Relativity only for limited subsets of results rather than 
the for the full range of predictions. For example, in the study by Konishi (1993) already 
described, German and Spanish speakers both showed evidence of perceiving objects with 
masculine gender as more ‘potent’ than objects with feminine gender, with ‘potent’ rated as a 
masculine trait; however, participants also rated ‘negative’ as a masculine trait, but this 
property did not transfer to objects. Indeed, even the link with potency involved very small 
differences between masculine and feminine concepts. Similarly, in a Sex Assignment task, 
Nicoladis, Da Costa, and Foursha-Stevenson (2016) found that Russian-English bilingual pre-
schoolers assigned male sex to masculine gender objects more frequently than they did to 
neuter gender objects, but not more frequently than they did to feminine gender objects; and 
in a Voice Choice task, decisions have been found to be consistent with masculine gender but 
not with feminine gender (Bassetti, 2007).  
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As mentioned earlier, the prevailing standpoint is that neither a strong view of 
Relativity nor a universalist view, provides an accurate account of the relationship between 
language and thought, and as a result the absences of evidence and the mixed results hint at 
precisely the systematic constraints most researchers seek to reveal. It is our view that a 
systematic review of the empirical literature would be well-placed to begin the process of 
drawing conclusions concerning the strength, extent and limitations of any such relationship.  
Before describing the results of the review, we outline the six potential constraints or 
‘parameters’ that we have extracted from discussions in the literature. The assessment of the 
influence of these parameters, together with the effects of the large variety of tasks used in 
this field, run through our review. Finally, we consider whether the literature supports the 
view that the effects of grammatical gender are primarily about language, or whether the 
effects attributed to Relativity might instead be explained by statistical co-occurrences and 
associations that are carried by language, but are not linguistic themselves. Such questions 
have the potential to go to the heart of contemporary thought about the role of language in 
cognition (Lupyan, 2012; Thierry, 2016). 
 
1.1. The salience of gender/sex in the task. 
In terms of methodology, many studies that have found effects of grammatical gender 
have tended to come from explicit judgments when gender and/or sex is a salient context in 
the experiment (e.g. Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003; Saalbach, Imai, & Schalk, 2012; Sera et al., 
1994; Sera et al., 2002). Indeed, the most common task in the field, Voice Choice, asks 
participants to assign a biological sex to an object. Given the nature of the question (i.e., there 
is no objectively correct answer), the participant may seek some rationale for their choices 
rather than assign at random. Under such conditions, the chances of grammatical gender 
being consciously recruited are increased, potentially undermining a conceptual change 
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account. A number of scholars have raised this issue (e.g., Bender, Beller, & Klauer, 2011; 
Bender et al., 2018; Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2008; Pavlidou & Alvanoudi, 2013; 
Ramos & Roberson, 2011), and Phillips and Boroditsky (2003) have suggested that it is 
difficult to resolve empirically. For instance, in study 2 of Sera et al. (1994), reference to 
‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ was removed from the instructions from the previous experiment, 
but participants were nevertheless still required to assign male or female voices. Even when 
the role of gender/sex is less prominent in a task, it is often still high. For instance, the EAST 
(Bender et al., 2016a, 2016b) maps all responses onto the same keys, meaning that even when 
participants respond according to colour they do so using a key that has also been assigned to 
a biological sex. This is a necessary facet of a design that relies on mapping two concepts to 
the same response in order to test for any effect of the overlap. Any strategic use of 
grammatical gender, or simply its recruitment via strong associations with biological sex in a 
task, might undermine the case for conceptual change account of results, and it is clearly 
important to understand the extent to which evidence in favour of Relativity might rely on 
such possibilities by means of comparing high versus low-gender/sex salience in tasks.  
 
1.2. The salience of language in the task. 
Another issue concerns the salience of language in the task, and whether the design 
instead indexes language processes as in ‘thinking for speaking’ (Slobin, 1996). Indeed, it 
was an early requirement of language and thought research that effects of language should be 
evident on non-linguistic tasks (R. Brown & Lenneberg, 1954). As with the salience of 
gender/sex, it is important to understand the extent to which the evidence for Relativity might 
rest upon the recruitment of grammatical gender through language processing rather than any 
underlying conceptual change. We therefore classified research as either high or low in terms 
of the salience of language in the task. 
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1.3. Testing participants in their gendered language. 
For some, testing that occurs in participants’ gendered language limits inferences to 
effects of grammatical gender on concepts within that language, rather than concepts 
themselves (Boroditsky & Schmidt, 2000; Slobin, 1996); if one’s language means that ‘bed’ 
is masculine, ‘bed’ should be conceptualised as masculine not only when acting in the 
context of that particular language but also when acting in a non-gendered language, such as 
English. By definition, this argument suggests that research is best conducted on bilinguals. 
In favour of such a possibility, testing participants in a second, ungendered language context 
has also revealed influences of a first-language gender system (Boroditsky & Schmidt, 2000; 
Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003; Semenuks et al., 2017). In order to test this particular 
hypothesis, we classified experiments in terms of whether participants performed in their 
gendered or non-gendered language.  
 
1.4. Two-gender versus three-gender languages. 
Another issue concerns the precise nature of the grammatical gender system under 
investigation. For example, in Romance languages like Spanish, Italian, and French most 
nouns that refer to humans carry grammatical gender that is consistent with the target’s 
biological sex. In German, however, the correlation is weaker, in part owing to its third, 
neuter gender, but also because German articles do not always differentiate between genders 
as a result of the German case system. This can result, for example, in even animates being 
labelled with a grammatical gender incongruent with their biological sex. The issue of two- 
versus three-gendered languages therefore concerns whether an influence might be strongest 
in speakers of languages with two gender classes that form a particularly ‘tight fit’ with 
semantic gender (see Saalbach et al., 2012; Sera et al., 1994; Vigliocco, Vinson, Paganelli, & 
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Dworzynski, 2005). Results with German speakers on Voice Choice tasks have indicated that 
grammatical gender does not influence decisions in the way that, for example, French or 
Spanish grammatical gender does (Sera et al., 2002). If this pattern was borne out in a 
broader review, it might suggest a statistical, correlative relationship between biological sex 
and grammatical gender in Relativity2. For Lucy (2016), the structural consequences of 
grammatical gender (case markings, adjective agreement, etc.) are too often overlooked, and 
might explain some inconsistencies in results. We classified experiments in terms of whether 
participants spoke a two- or three-gendered language3. 
 
1.5. Effects with animate and inanimate targets. 
Another parameter concerns whether grammatical gender might influence the 
conceptualisations of animate but not inanimate targets (e.g., Vigliocco et al., 2005). For 
                                               
2 The potential for grammatical gender effects on object conceptualisation to be the result of 
statistical co-occurrences goes to the heart of a debate around whether grammatical gender is 
in fact a suitable tool for investigating Relativity at all, and it is one we turn to in detail later 
in this section and in the Discussion. 
3 Not all two-gendered languages divide nouns into masculine and feminine; some (like 
Dutch, Swedish, and some Norwegian dialects) instead divide nouns into ‘gendered’ and 
‘neuter’ categories. To our knowledge only one study in our review included participants who 
spoke a language of this type: Bergensk, a language spoken in Norway (Beller, Brattebø, 
Lavik, Reigstad, & Bender, 2015). For the purposes of the review, we excluded the results of 
this study from our two- vs. three-gender comparison. The sample size (N=107) suggests that 
neither leaving this study in nor taking it out would have any meaningful effect on the 
patterns of results described.  
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example, participants who speak a gendered language (German) showed a greater willingness 
to erroneously endorse sex-specific statements about animals if those statements were 
consistent with the animals’ grammatical gender than speakers of an ungendered language 
(Japanese), but the same was not true of inanimate targets (Imai, Schalk, Saalbach, & Okada, 
2014). In a series of priming experiments, Bender et al. (2011) asked German speakers to 
decide the gender of a target word after they had seen either i) a definite article denoting 
gender (der for masculine and die for feminine); ii) the words Mann (Man) and Frau 
(Woman); iii) the symbols for male and female; or iv) pictograms of a man or woman. They 
found that the congruent linguistic article primes sped up judgments relative to incongruent 
trials, for both animate and inanimate targets. However, of the other primes only the 
Mann/Frau pictograms had an effect, and only on animate targets. The researchers concluded 
that the grammatical gender of objects does not appear to ‘seep’ into the semantic content of 
inanimate nouns. A broadly similar pattern was found in the Properties Judgment task by 
Semenuks et al. (2017). Results like these have led some scholars to suggest that grammatical 
gender is only relevant to conceptualisation when sex is a relevant property of the target 
(Ramos & Roberson, 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2005). If this is true, then Relativity is subject to 
an important constraint, namely that grammatical gender only interacts with targets which 
have biological sex in the first place. We classified experiments in terms of whether 
participants responded to animate or inanimate targets. 
 
 
1.6. Stronger effects in adults than children. 
Finally, studies with adults have been thought to provide more supporting evidence 
for Relativity than studies with children, and particularly very young children. For example, 
only 6 out of 18 Spanish-speaking 3-5 year-olds freely sorted pictures of inanimate objects 
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and male and female people into groups defined by grammatical gender (Martinez & Shatz, 
1996), and only very limited effects of grammatical gender on object conceptualisation, or 
indeed no effect at all, have been found in other studies with young children (Bassetti, 2007; 
Nicoladis & Foursha-Stevenson, 2012; Sera et al., 2002). Weaker effects at younger ages are 
consistent with the possibility that it is experience with grammatical gender that leads to 
biological sex connotations with objects, but also with the possibility that it is metalinguistic 
knowledge of grammatical gender acquired through formal instruction rather than 
grammatical gender assignment itself that might explain some positive results. We classified 
studies in terms of whether participants were children (<18) or adults. 
 
1.7. An existential question for Relativity: What is ‘gendered’ about grammatical 
gender? 
A crucial question that underpins everything in this review concerns the nature of the 
grammatical gender itself. It has been pointed out that the ‘gender’ in grammatical gender is 
not intrinsic to language but is itself an arbitrary, human-made label (Bender et al., 2018). At 
some point in their lives speakers of gendered languages usually learn that the formal names 
for the categories are ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’, but would they ever choose those names 
without formal instruction? As highlighted by Foundalis (2002) ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ 
are in fact poor predictors of the majority of nouns in their class, and even the relationship 
between the meanings of the words gender and sex are stronger for speakers of non-gendered 
languages, such as English; speakers of gendered languages would not usually use the 
translation equivalent for ‘gender’ in grammatical gender to refer to biological sex at all. 
Grammatical gender has usually been perceived as a particularly useful tool to study 
Relativity because its assignment patterns are so arbitrary and have no psychological reality 
outside of language itself, but the same point could be levelled with more detrimental 
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consequences for the research paradigm at the titles of the categories themselves, which are 
metalinguistic labels (they describe something about language) detached from the use of the 
grammar itself. Grammatical gender therefore appears to suffers from an identity problem 
that other tools used to investigate Relativity do not. To illustrate, we might as a thought 
experiment substitute the labels ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ for either ‘plant’ and ‘non-plant’, 
‘sky’ and ‘earth’, ‘group one’ and ‘group two’, ‘x’ and ‘y’, or any number of arbitrary labels 
without interfering with the performative use of a gendered language itself. We might predict 
that if we told a cohort of Spanish speakers to go about their day ‘believing’ that the titles of 
the classes had changed to ‘x’ and ‘y’, they could simply continue to refer to la mesa (thef 
table) and el libro (them book) with no real-world consequences. If however we asked the 
same cohort to randomly shuffle their colour words mappings for a day such that they might 
need to refer to the Spanish word for ‘green’ with the Spanish word for ‘blue’, or to swap 
their spatial prepositions such that ‘over’ might become ‘under’, we ask them to violate the 
rules of language use, and we would expect there to be errors.  
If the labels ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ are in a sense historical accidents, it has 
consequences for the use of these categories in the Relativity paradigm because effects that 
have previously been attributed to conceptual change might in fact be the result of simple 
statistical co-occurrences and associations between two groups of labels: the entirely 
arbitrary, human-made labels of metalinguistic grammatical classes on the one hand, and the 
similarly arbitrary ‘gender’ assignment to noun labels on the other. This would be the 
equivalent, for example, of finding that English speakers conceive of the digits 3, 5, 7 and 9 
as somehow ‘weirder’ that 2, 4, 6 and 8 because the former are arbitrarily labelled as ‘odd’. 
While language would be the vehicle of any statistical associations, the outcome becomes 
trivial in the context of classic views of Relativity as engaging conceptual change.  
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What patterns would a statistical co-occurrence account predict? We would expect 
five out of the six parameters described to influence results. Firstly, speakers of a two-
gendered language should show stronger effects than speakers of three-gendered languages 
because the relationship between human biological sex and grammatical gender is reinforced 
through greater repetition and a stronger gender/sex correlation in human animates, at least 
when compared to the three-gendered language most commonly used in the field (German). 
We would additionally predict that performing in a gendered language would give rise to 
such associations in a way that performing in a non-gendered language like English might 
not. We would predict that the more salient the role of both gender/sex and language in the 
experiment, the greater the opportunity for associations between biological sex and language 
to be engaged. Finally, we would expect the presence of animate targets to elicit biological 
sex information more than inanimate targets. A sixth possibility, albeit a theoretically more 
tenuous one, is that adults will have more strongly reinforced associations than children 
owing to their greater quantitative experience of language. Interestingly, all these parameter 
settings have already been cited in the literature as conducive to finding effects of 
grammatical gender, although these suggestions have not yet been supported by a systematic 
review. Assuming that the strong version of Relativity is wrong (as we do) it then becomes 
important to decide whether effects of grammatical gender are statistical and associative or an 
effect of language on the fabric of conceptual representation itself.  
 
2. Review 
 2.1. The remit of the review. 
This review includes i) empirical research with ii) human participants; iii) real 
languages and words (rather than languages and words invented for the purposes of 
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experimentation); iv) being either published or unpublished; and v) reported in English4. 
Studies were also required to test the influence of grammatical gender on at least some non-
human targets (excluding, therefore, studies on grammatical gender and gender stereotyping 
of men and women).  
Formal searches were conducted encompassing the years 1990 to 2018 using the 
search terms “grammatical” and “gender” together, once with “Whorf” and once with 
“relativity”, in Web Of Science (all) and Google Scholar (first 5 pages). Additionally, we 
searched the EThOS PhD thesis bank using the terms “grammatical” and “gender” for the 
broadest possible range of results and the NDLTD thesis bank using “grammatical gender”, 
once with “Whorf” and once with “relativity”. All studies from a recent special issue of the 
International Journal of Bilingualism (volume 20/1) were included where relevant. To ensure 
maximal representation of relevant data and to minimise the potential for skewed results 
owing to potential publication biases (e.g. De Bruin, Treccani, & Della Sala, 2015), we also 
emailed the corresponding author of every study revealed in the first stage of the review to 
request any unpublished or in-press results. Finally, a call for data was also issued on the 
Research Gate website as part of a project linked to the present review. A further thirteen 
pieces of empirical research not turned up by these searches were added either because they 
were known to the authors or offered/recommended to the authors as part of this contact 
phase. The full list of items included and excluded from the review can be found in the 
Supplemental Online Materials (SOM1). 
 
2.2. Classifications by task. 
                                               
4 Only one study discovered by the search procedure was eventually excluded for the absence 
of an English translation (see SOM1) 
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Owing to the heterogeneity of methodologies in the field, we opted to sort each 
individual experiment into eight task types: Voice Choice; Properties Judgments; EAST; Sex 
Assignment; Priming; Similarity Judgment; Association; Object-Name Memory Association. 
These eight task types were chosen because they were different enough in methodology to be 
considered in their own right. To illustrate, we felt that the closest pair was Voice Choice/Sex 
Assignment, since both involve explicit biological sex judgements to be made about targets. 
However, Voice Choice tasks require the participant to imagine an object speaking, which 
might recruit thinking about language in a way that assigning biological sex alone might not5.  
We classified every experiment according to the six parameters previously described 
as potentially important to the outcomes of research. We adopted the following approach to 
these classifications. Regarding Language Content, we asked whether language goes in to the 
task (for example, the stimuli are words), or comes out of the task (for example, choosing 
between words such as ‘male’ or ‘female’, thinking of adjectives in Property Judgment 
tasks). Where neither occurs, or where any role of language is judged to be highly orthogonal, 
that study is classified as Low Language Content. The same approach was taken to 
Gender/Sex Content (gender or sex information should not go in to the task or be part of the 
response or process leading to the response). The other parameters (Age, Language, Number 
of Gender Categories, and Target Type) were readily classifiable at face value. Full details of 
item classifications can be found in SOM2. 
 
2.3. Classifications of results 
                                               
5 Additionally, there is at present no empirical evidence that participants assign the same 
biological sex to the same objects across both tasks. 
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Given that the results of tasks are sometimes not unambiguous in their support or 
otherwise of Relativity, each individual study was classified in terms of one of three 
outcomes: Support, Mixed Support, or No Support. Studies classified as offering Support 
showed an effect of grammatical gender on conceptualisations consistent with the hypothesis 
employed. A study was classified as offering No Support if there was an absence of evidence 
for Relativity that could be classified minimally as Mixed Support. Studies were classified as 
offering Mixed Support if they showed partial confirmation of an influence, such as an 
influence of one gender but not another (Bassetti, 2007), marginally significant effects (e.g. 
Semenuks et al., 2017), an influence in accuracy but not in response times (e.g. Bender et al., 
2016a; Bender et al., 2016b), or an influence shown on one criterion but not another (e.g. 
Konishi, 1993). SOM2 lists these classifications for each experiment. 
 
2.4. Adjustments for sample size 
Given that sample sizes varied widely from study to study and condition to condition 
(from 7 to 924), we report results taking sample size into account. This has the obvious 
benefit of weighting the pattern of results in favour of those studies that are most likely to be 
highest-powered and less susceptible to spurious effects. Given that the same participants 
sometimes performed multiple conditions or analyses, we also allowed multiple data points in 
the review from the same participants. For example, this review allowed for separate data 
points for inanimate and animate targets from the same group. In such cases, separate 
classifications are necessary to ascertain the effect of different parameters, such that the 
evidence from animate targets might be classified as offering Support, but the results from 
inanimate targets classified as No Support. Full details can be found in SOM2. 
This review adopts a methodological approach somewhere between a vote-count 
system (owing to the classifications of Support, Mixed Support or No Support) and a 
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statistical meta-analysis (owing to sample-size adjustments) (cf. Samuel, Roehr-Brackin, Pak, 
& Kim, 2018). Given the heterogeneity of research methods, languages tested, and so on, 
occasionally only very small clusters of studies could be considered to be using the same 
methods, and often these were studies that came from the same labs and sampled the same 
type of linguistic population. We therefore considered this approach the better way to provide 
an overview of the multiple ways in which the field has investigated the research question, 
and how different designs may culminate in different outcomes. 
 
 2.5. What is not in the review. 
We excluded studies that looked not for relationships between targets and biological 
sex but rather for relationships between objects of the same grammatical gender versus 
objects of different grammatical gender (e.g., Almutrafi, 2015, exp. 2; Bobb & Mani, 2013; 
Boutonnet et al., 2012; Cubelli, Paolieri, Lotto, & Job, 2011; Kousta et al., 2008; Yorkston & 
De Mello, 2005). For example, it has been demonstrated that semantic category judgments 
about nouns belonging to the same grammatical gender are processed more quickly than 
nouns from different grammatical gender (Cubelli et al., 2011), and that grammatical gender 
information is processed in semantic similarity tasks even when irrelevant and undetectable 
by behavioural measures (Boutonnet et al., 2012). Although such studies offer support for the 
processing of grammatical gender information when it is apparently task-irrelevant (a useful 
prerequisite for tasks in this review), and even show that objects of the same grammatical 
gender are perceived to be more similar than objects which are not, this is not the same as 
demonstrating that objects are conceptualised as more masculine or feminine as a function of 
their gender assignment. Such results might be explained in terms of an effect of membership 
of the same grammatical category, independently of biological sex information (cf. Cook, 
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2016). As this review is entirely concerned with this specific relationship, such studies, 
though clearly interesting in their own right, were omitted.  
There have also been studies assessing how and when grammatical gender is 
processed in language production and comprehension, including in bilinguals for whom the 
grammatical gender for the same object might be opposite in their two languages (Costa, 
Kovacic, Fedorenko, & Caramazza, 2003; Costa, Kovacic, Franck, & Caramazza, 2003). 
Again, such studies are not designed to look at whether object conceptualization has the 
potential to be influenced by the biological sex connotation of their grammatical gender 
assignment, and they were therefore excluded. 
The review does not include one study which does pertain to grammatical gender and 
biological sex but where a meaningful understanding of the number of participants is not 
possible. This was the study by Segel and Boroditsky (2011), in which depictions of 
personifications and allegories in thousand or works of art were classified retrospectively in 
terms of their gender congruency. This was notionally classified as Support. 
Finally, the remit of the review excludes studies that do not involve human 
participants but investigate the question of Relativity through the connectionist models (e.g., 
Dilkina, McClelland, & Boroditsky, 2007; Sera et al., 2002), or through training in artificial 
‘languages’ (Eberhard, Heilman, & Scheutz, 2005; Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003, experiments 
4 and 5; Sera et al., 2002, experiment 4) or nonsense words (Konishi, 1994; Vuksanovic, 
Bjekic, & Radivojevic, 2015). This is because we felt that we should limit our scope to 
behaviour more clearly grounded in the experience of real people with real grammatical 
gender categories. 
 
3. Results  
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Overall, the initial search found 99 individual pieces of research, with a further 13 
added that were known to the authors but were not revealed by the formal search. After 
removing those items which did not provide empirical data, the review included 43 individual 
pieces of research, one of which was unpublished (Nicoladis, unpublished), and three of 
which were doctoral or masters theses (Almutrafi, 2015; Degani, 2007; Landor, 2014). The 
remaining pieces of research were published journal articles, conference proceedings (always 
of the Cognitive Science Society) or book chapters. After subdividing this research by task 
type and condition, these pieces of research resulted in 158 lines of data (split by differences 
in conditions within experiments) which together surveyed 5,895 participants in total.  
As described earlier, we then calculated the number of ‘samples’, which was 7,334. 
This number differs from the number of participants because it allows for the possibility that 
the same participant may have performed in multiple conditions. It is for this reason that the 
number of samples can be higher (but not lower) than the number of participants. We present 
all our results in the context of samples, rather than participants, in order to capture these 
important within-experiment differences.  
 
 
3.1. Overall results. 
Across the review as a whole, results from 32% of all samples were classified as 
offering Support for Relativity, 24% were classified as offering Mixed Support, and 43% No 
Support. With the exception of one particularly large study (Montefinese, Ambrosini, & 
Roivainen, 2018, N = 924 and N = 105, total N = 1029), there was no evidence that the 
results were driven by only a small cluster of highly-powered studies (see Figure 1). If this 
outlying study were removed, Support would be at 38%, Mixed Support at 28%, and No 
Support at 34%. 
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Figure 1. Number of samples (vertical axis) for each research item, or line of the review 
(horizontal axis). Mean and median samples are displayed in the text box. The outlier is 
Montefinese et al. (2018) with a Properties Judgment task (N = 924 Italian speakers). 
 
In what follows, we first describe the results by task type. We then describe results as 
a function of task parameters. A full at-a-glance view of all the results by task type and by 
parameter can be found in Figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 2. Classification of Support, Mixed Support and No Support by task type. Total 
number of samples is shown on the y-axis. 
 
 
Figure 3. Classification of Support, Mixed Support and No Support according to task 
parameters. Total number of samples is shown on the y-axis. 
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3.2 Results by task type 
Properties Judgment. Full results for the Properties Judgment task are displayed in 
Table 2. Properties Judgments made up 37% of all samples in the review, making it the most 
commonly-performed task in the literature (that is, it comes with the highest number of 
samples, rather than the highest number of uses in the literature). Only 3% of samples were 
classified as offering Support (Flaherty, 2001; Imai et al., 2014; Saalbach et al., 2012). A 
further 23% were classified as Mixed Support; reasons were finding that results were more 
consistent with grammatical gender in one group than another (that spoke a different 
language), but apparently not more so than chance itself (Haertlé, 2017), results limited to 
one property but not another despite evidence that both were linked to biological sex 
(Konishi, 1993), evidence to suggest an effect of the grammatical gender of a language the 
participants did not speak, with no direct comparison of this effect with the language they did 
speak (Sedlmeier, Tipandjan, & Jänchen, 2016), and effects limited to second- and third-
choice adjectives but not first-choice adjectives (Semenuks et al., 2017). The remaining 75% 
of samples offered cases of No Support at all (Flaherty, 2001; Imai et al., 2014; Landor, 
2014; Mickan, Schiefke, & Stefanowitsch, 2014; Montefinese et al., 2018; Semenuks et al., 
2017). It should be noted that the study by Montefinese et al. (2018) represents an extreme 
outlier, with over 1000 participants in total. The results of this study were classified as No 
Support. However, even if the results of this study were removed, the rate of Support for 
Properties Judgment tasks would only rise to 4%. All Properties Judgment tasks were 
intrinsically High in Language Content, and all have so far been conducted with adult 
participants. Given the almost floor-level overall rate of Support, an examination of the effect 
of different factor parameters was not conducted. 
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Table 1. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
Properties task. NB – samples are repeated multiple times across parameters, hence 
difference from bottom-line totals. 
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
Gender/Sex High 33 0 65 98 
 Low 40 609 1942 2591 
Gend. Lang. High 73 336 1734 2143 
 Low 0 273 273 546 
No. of Gend. Two 40 60 1337 1437 
 Three 33 276 397 706 
Target Animate 33 273 24 330 
 Inanimate 0 120 1943 2063 
Age Adults 57 609 1967 2633 
 Children 16 0 40 56 
TOTAL  73 609 2007 2689 
 
 
Voice Choice. Full results for the Voice Choice task are displayed in Table 2. The 
Voice Choice paradigm, while the most common experimental task for researchers, is the 
second most commonly-performed by participants in the field, accounting for 28% of all 
samples. Of these, 64% were classified as offering Support (Almutrafi, 2015; Athanasopoulos 
& Boutonnet, 2016; Beller et al., 2015; Bender et al., 2016a; Haertlé, 2017; Kurinski et al., 
2016; Lambelet, 2016; Ramos & Roberson, 2011; Sera et al., 1994; Sera et al., 2002; 
Vernich, 2017; Vernich, Argus, & Kamandulytė-Merfeldienė, 2017). An additional 22% 
were classified as Mixed Support; these included results consistent with the hypothesis but 
limited to one of two genders (Bassetti, 2007), effects for limited subsets of targets (Beller et 
al., 2015; Bender et al., 2016a), and statistically marginal results (Bender et al., 2018). Mixed 
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results also included cases where data suggested that voice choices were not more consistent 
with grammatical gender than chance levels (Forbes, Poulin-Dubois, Rivero, & Sera, 2008; 
Sera et al., 2002), and effects limited to native speakers but not learners (including advanced 
learners6) of the same language (Kurinski & Sera, 2011). A minority of samples offered No 
Support at all (12%) (Bassetti, 2007; Bender et al., 2018; Forbes et al., 2008; Sera et al., 
1994; Sera et al., 2002).  
All Voice Choice tasks were classified as having a High Gender content and High 
Language Content. A greater rate of support for Relativity was found when participants spoke 
a language with two genders (69%) instead of three (24%). There was also more support from 
adult samples (69%) than children (39%). To illustrate these comparisons, the majority of No 
Support cases came from participants who were 5-6 year-olds (Sera et al., 1994; Sera et al., 
2002), 9 year-olds, (Bassetti, 2007), or adult speakers of German, a three-gendered language 
(Bender et al., 2018). In contrast, there was no evidence that voice choices were more 
consistent with grammatical gender when applied to animate (38%) than inanimate objects 
(68%), and a lower rate of Support was found when assigning voices in one’s gendered 
language (56%) relative to one’s ungendered language (73%). Some of these results might be 
skewed by the relative dearth of child samples, samples who performed the task in a low 
                                               
6 This study included 102 participants of varying levels of Spanish. Any effect of 
grammatical gender in the advanced learners in this experiment was confounded with the 
usually more reliable natural/artificial distinction (Mullen, 1990). Note that if this item were 
included as Support owing to the 26 native-speaking participants’ performance alone, it 
would only move these 26 samples (the number of native Spanish speakers) from Mixed 
Support to Support. 
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gendered-language context, with a three-gendered language background, or with animate 
targets.  
 
Table 2. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
Voice Choice task. NB – samples are repeated multiple times across parameters, hence 
difference from bottom-line totals. 
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
Gend. Lang. High 837 415 245 1497 
 Low 177 32 32 241 
No. of Gend. Two 828 187 180 1195 
 Three 79 153 97 329 
Target Animate 107 99 76 282 
 Inanimate 1189 348 201 1738 
Age Adults 1160 372 140 1672 
 Children 136 75 137 348 
TOTAL  1296 447 277 2020 
 
 
Sex Assignment. Full results for the Sex Assignment task are displayed in Table 3. 
Sex Assignment tasks are almost identical to Voice Choice tasks in that they are explicit 
assignments of male or female sex to animate and inanimate objects. Largely thanks to the 
study by Belacchi and Cubelli (2012), representing 412 samples (46% of all samples with this 
paradigm), Sex Assignment makes up 12% of samples in the review. 
Overall, 66% of samples were classified as offering Support (Belacchi & Cubelli, 
2012; Flaherty, 2001; Pavlidou & Alvanoudi, 2018; Sera et al., 1994), 26% Mixed Support 
(Bender et al., 2016b; Nicoladis, unpublished; Nicoladis et al., 2016; Nicoladis & Foursha-
Stevenson, 2012; Pavlidou & Alvanoudi, 2013), and 8% No Support (Flaherty, 2001; 
Nicoladis & Foursha-Stevenson, 2012).  
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Sex Assignment tasks are intrinsically classified as High in Gender/Sex content. 
Although they need not also have a High Language content, they were judged High for every 
study in this review. For animate targets the rate of Support was 100%, higher than for 
inanimate targets (33%). The rate of Support in children (62%) was slightly higher than in 
adults (69%). The rate of Support was 75% when participants performed in their gendered 
language but zero in an ungendered language. Finally, the rate of Support from two-gendered 
languages was high (83%), but from three-gendered languages was low (23%). Again, some 
of these comparisons (with the probable exception of Age) might be skewed by imbalances in 
the number of samples that were classified as performing under each parameter setting 
 
Table 3. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
Sex Assignment task. NB – samples are repeated multiple times across parameters, hence 
difference from bottom-line totals. 
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
Gend. Lang. High 594 151 48 793 
 Low 0 78 27 105 
No. of Gend. Two 538 38 75 651 
 Three 56 191 0 247 
Target Animate 412 0 0 412 
 Inanimate 30 61 0 91 
Age Adults 214 131 0 345 
 Children 380 98 75 553 
TOTAL  594 229 75 898 
 
EAST. Full results for the EAST are displayed in Table 4. The EAST is a unique case 
in this review because it has only been used by one core group of researchers (Bender et al., 
2016a, 2016b, 2018), and only ever with adult speakers of German, which is a three-gender 
language. It comprises 9% of samples. There is a good case that it might constitute a priming 
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task, but given its singularity we felt it was best considered as a category of task in its own 
right. Overall, only 11% of samples were classified as offering Support (Bender et al., 2016a, 
2018), while 56% were classified as offering Mixed Support (Bender et al., 2016a, 2016b, 
2018) and 33% No Support (Bender et al., 2016a, 2018).  
Variation in results by parameter should be interpreted in the context of the low 
overall rate of Support. The EAST uses a two-key response method, with one clearly mapped 
to ‘male’ and one to ‘female’, hence Gender Context is always High, and since the stimuli are 
always words, Language Context is also High. In fact, the only possible parameter 
comparison that can be made with the EAST concerns inanimate and animate targets., which 
showed similar levels of Support (10% vs. 11% respectively).  
 
Table 4. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
EAST.  
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
Target Animate 30 89 146 265 
 Inanimate 40 274 70 384 
TOTAL  70 363 216 649 
 
 
Priming. Full results for Priming tasks are displayed in Table 5. There are only five 
different pieces of research with priming experiments in the literature, comprising 8% of 
samples in the review. Care must be taken when attempting to interpret parameter patterns 
from only a handful of studies where settings can be entirely confounded with individual 
papers. Overall, Priming offered a 34% Support rate (Bender et al., 2011; Sato & 
Athanasopoulos, 2018) and 66% No Support rate (Bender et al., 2011; Degani, 2007; Mickan 
et al., 2014; Samuel et al., 2016). There were no cases of Mixed classifications. Given the 
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small overall numbers of Support (198 samples in total), coming from only two papers, 
comparisons were unlikely to reveal any reliable patterns.  
 
Table 5. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
Priming tasks. NB – samples are repeated multiple times across parameters, hence difference 
from bottom-line totals. 
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
Language High 170 0 389 559 
 Low 28 0 0 28 
Gender/Sex High 170 0 317 487 
 Low 28 0 72 100 
Gend. Lang. High 142 0 317 459 
 Low 56 0 72 128 
No. of Gend. Two 56 0 67 123 
 Three 142 0 306 448 
Target Animate 170 0 48 218 
 Inanimate 28 0 341 369 
TOTAL  198 0 389 587 
 
 
Similarity Judgment. Full results for Similarity tasks are displayed in Table 6. 
Similarity Judgment tasks comprised only 3% of all samples. The pattern of results indicating 
44% Support (Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003), 45% Mixed Support (Sedlmeier et al., 2016), 
and 11% No Support (Degani, 2007) is entirely confounded with the three individual pieces 
of research to use the task. The small number of samples with this task make it difficult to 
draw meaningful conclusions as to what might lead to differences in results. 
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Table 6. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
Similarity tasks. NB – samples are repeated multiple times across parameters, hence 
difference from bottom-line totals. 
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
Language High 0 108 27 135 
 Low 105 0 0 105 
Gender/Sex High 105 0 27 132 
 Low 0 108 0 108 
Gend. Lang. High 0 108 27 135 
 Low 105 0 0 105 
No. of Gend. Two 29 0 27 56 
 Three 40 108 0 148 
TOTAL  105 108 27 240 
 
 
Association. Full results for Similarity tasks are displayed in Table 7. Only two 
pieces of research have employed an Association paradigm (Bender et al., 2018; Martinez & 
Shatz, 1996), which together comprise only 2% of samples in the review. All the studies with 
this paradigm were classified as No Support. Gender content and Language content were 
always High, and participants were always tested on inanimate targets and in a gendered-
language context.  
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Table 7. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
Association tasks. NB – samples are repeated multiple times across parameters, hence 
difference from bottom-line totals. 
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
No. of Gend. Two 0 0 18 18 
 Three 0 0 119 119 
Age Adults 0 0 119 119 
 Children 0 0 18 18 
TOTAL  0 0 137 137 
 
 
Object-Name Memory Association. Full results for Object-Name Association tasks 
are displayed in Table 8. Comprising just under 2% of samples in the review, Object-Name 
Memory Association paradigms form the smallest task-type classification in this review. The 
task has been used in three separate pieces of research. Of the samples, 36% came under 
Support (Boroditsky & Schmidt, 2000), 31% Mixed Support (Kaushanskaya & Smith, 2016), 
and 33% No Support (Pavlidou & Alvanoudi, 2013). Note that these differences are split 
entirely by publication. All these studies were classified as having a High Gender content and 
High Language content. All were conducted with adult participants, and all included 
inanimate targets.  
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Table 8. Number of samples according to parameter setting and results classification, for the 
Object-Name Association tasks. NB – samples are repeated multiple times across 
parameters, hence difference from bottom-line totals. 
Parameter Setting Support Mixed  No Support TOTAL 
No. of Gend. Two 25 35 0 60 
 Three 16 0 38 54 
Gend. Lang. High 0 0 38 38 
 Low 41 35 0 76 
TOTAL  41 35 38 114 
 
 
3.3. Results by task parameters 
The distribution of samples displayed in Figure 3 points to a number of imbalances in 
the literature to date; samples in this review were typically involved in experiments with a 
high language content (98%). Samples were usually adults (87%), performing in their 
gendered language (83%), with inanimate targets (76%), with high sex/gender salience in the 
task (62%). Samples also usually spoke a language with two gender categories (57%). In 
other words, the average experiment incorporates five out of six of the parameter settings that 
are usually considered most conducive to results in support for Relativity (inanimate targets 
being the exception).  
Changes in the rate of Support as a function of task parameters are displayed in Table 
9. In the following sections we describe comparisons where it is possible to isolate one 
category from another. A study that puts speakers of two-gendered and three-gendered 
languages into the same group, for example, are excluded entirely rather than added to both 
categories. 
Table 9. Summary of shifts in the rate of Support as a function of task parameters. The 
rightmost column displays the outcomes in terms of the indicators of a statistical association 
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account rather than a Relativity account. NB – ‘Language’ was almost entirely (98%) set at 
High. 
Parameter Setting Support Statistical Association Account 
Gender/Sex High 51% (+49% Support) = Consistent 
 Low 2%  
Language High N/A N/A 
 Low N/A  
Gend. Lang. High 29% (-3% Support) = Not consistent 
 Low 32%  
No. of Gend. Two 43% (+27% Support) = Consistent 
 Three 16%  
Target Animate 50% (+23% Support) = Consistent 
 Inanimate 27%  
Age Adults 29% (-26% Support) N/A 
 Children 55%  
 
 
Gender/Sex content. Consistent with previous views of the literature, as well as with 
a statistical association account of grammatical gender effects, studies with a High gender/sex 
content showed a higher rate of support (51%) than studies with Low gender/sex content 
(2%). The Voice Choice, Sex Assignment, EAST, Association, and Object-Name association 
task types were always classified as High. Samples classified as Low came almost entirely 
from the 2689 (96%) who performed Properties Judgment tasks, which came with only a 3% 
Support rate. However, only 98 samples from this paradigm were classified as High, 
rendering any more detailed comparisons unreliable.  
Language content. Almost all research was classified as High in Language content 
(98%). The almost complete absence of research classified as Low in Language Content 
makes any attempt to draw conclusions about this parameter liable to mislead. Only the 
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Priming and Similarity studies by Sato and Athanasopoulos (2018) and Phillips and 
Boroditsky (2003) respectively, both of which were classified as Support, were classified as 
Low in Language content. We return to this issue in our Discussion. 
 
Gendered vs. Ungendered language. A slightly lower rate of Support was found for 
studies performed in a gendered language (29%) than ungendered language (32%). This is 
not consistent with a statistical association account. When we compare performance in 
gendered and ungendered languages at the within-task level, we see that Support is higher in 
a gendered language context than an ungendered language context in the Sex Assignment 
task (75% vs. 0%) and the Properties tasks, albeit the latter with very low rates (3% vs. 0%). 
Support is slightly higher in the ungendered language for Voice Choice (73% vs. 56%) and 
Priming tasks (44% vs. 31%). It is also higher for Similarity tasks (100% vs. 0%), and 
Object-Name tasks (54% vs. 0%). Although 83% of all samples performed in a gendered 
language context, meaning comparisons are based on imbalanced sample sizes, the pattern of 
results within tasks suggest that there is no clear support for the hypothesis that grammatical 
gender is more likely to influence thought when participants perform in a gendered language. 
 
Two-gender vs. Three-gender languages. The review found higher rates of Support 
from studies with two-gender languages (43%) than three-gender languages (16%). This 
outcomes is consistent with a statistical association account. Broken down by task type, 
Support from two-gendered languages over three-gendered languages came from the Sex 
Assignment tasks (83% vs 23%), Voice Choice tasks (69% vs. 24%), Similarity tasks (52% 
vs. 27%), Priming tasks (46% vs. 32%), and Object-Name Association tasks (42% vs. 30%). 
Only Properties tasks (3% vs. 5%) reversed this pattern, albeit with negligible Support rates 
in each category.  
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Animate vs. Inanimate targets. Consistent with a statistical association account, 
studies with animate targets showed a higher rate of Support (50%) than studies with 
inanimate targets (27%). Broken down by task, this pattern was true of Sex Assignment tasks 
(100% vs. 33%), Priming tasks (78% vs, 8%), and Properties tasks (10% vs. 0%). Results 
from the EAST were almost matched (11% vs. 10%). The reverse pattern was found for 
Voice Choice tasks (38% vs. 68%). Note that the great bulk of the positive results from 
inanimate targets comes from the Voice Choice task (90% of samples).  
 
Adults vs. Children. In apparent contrast with some views expressed in the literature, 
research with children (55%) found a higher rate of Support than research with adults (29%). 
However, this result is strongly weighted by task type. Overall, 87% of samples came from 
adult participants, and the great bulk of the data from children comes from Voice Choice and 
Sex Assignment tasks (92%). Given that the tasks that children performed provided the 
highest rates of Support, and those performed almost exclusively by adults provide the lowest 
(e.g., Properties Judgments), it is difficult to know whether this outcome is the result of an 
age-related difference or a task-related difference. Looking at Age-related performance at the 
level of the individual task, there is some evidence that adults show a greater influence of 
grammatical gender than children; we see that the rate of Support is 30% higher in adults than 
children in Voice Choice tasks (69% vs. 39%), although it is 7% lower in adults Sex 
Assignment tasks (62% vs. 69%).  
 
3.4. Other patterns 
Almost half of all the data in the review (40%) came from the Voice Choice and Sex 
Assignment tasks, the two paradigms that make the clearest demand on participants to 
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consider targets in terms of biological sex. Since the potential for the strategic use of 
grammatical gender under such circumstances has been one of the most frequent issues 
brought up in the literature, we compared the rate of Support from the review as a whole with 
the results of these two paradigms included or excluded. Overall Support across the review 
drops from 32% to only 11% in their absence, and No Support rises from 43% to 64%. In 
other words, when all the data are included approximately one in three samples in the review 
provides Support; when the data from Voice Choice and Sex Assignment are excluded this 
rate drops to one in ten. 
 
4. Discussion 
At its broadest, the review finds that the evidence for an influence of grammatical 
gender on conceptualisations is highly task- and context-dependent. We found that the Voice 
Choice and Sex Assignment tasks formed the backbone of Support for Relativity; when they 
are removed, the Support rate drops to only 11%. With them included, about a third (32%) of 
the data was classified as Support, relative to a No Support rate of 43% and a Mixed Support 
rate of 24%. If we consider the possibility that publication biases mean that fewer null results 
make it to publication, it may be the case that even this Support rate is an overestimate. 
The review provides support for a number of important constraints on the Relativity 
hypothesis. For example, the rate of Support is higher when the Gender Content of a task is 
High rather than Low, suggesting any influence might be at least partly contingent on the 
opportunity to strategically call upon grammatical gender. Results are also more likely to be 
classified as Support when participants are processing animate rather than inanimate targets, 
which also suggests that language might be partly contingent on the immediacy of the overlap 
between grammatical gender and biological sex. This finding argues against a singular, 
uniform effect of gender category on all its members. Finally, results were more likely to 
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offer Support when the gendered language has two gender categories rather than three; a 
finding that is inconsistent with a straightforward account of grammatical gender 
classification per se influencing the conceptualisations of objects. The review initially 
appeared to reveal one misconception concerning Age; there was actually a higher rate of 
Support from samples of children than adults. Upon closer inspection, this outcome was 
closely bound to the fact that children performed those tasks that most consistently produced 
positive results for Relativity, namely Voice Choice and Sex Assignment. However, not all 
the predicted biases were supported. We found no evidence that Support was more common 
when participants performed a task in a gendered-language context, which is what is 
predicted by thinking-for-speaking accounts. The only parameter that could not be 
meaningfully assessed at all concerned the salience of otherwise of language in the task, an 
issue that we return to later in this Discussion. 
What these parameter-related comparisons reveal is that much of the positive 
evidence for Relativity comes from tasks and conditions that are particularly susceptible to 
alternative, strategy-based explanations. Overall, we therefore take the results of this review 
as imposing quite powerful constraints on the Relativity hypothesis as seen through the lens 
of grammatical gender. Nevertheless, this conclusion itself comes with a caveat; we feel the 
review also points to a significant weakness in much of the relevant research’s ability to 
speak to the issue of Relativity with clarity. This means that future research could either 
cement this rather negative conclusion, or overturn it through stronger designs that are less 
susceptible to confounds. As a result, we suggest that our review provides an interim rather 
than final pattern of results.  
We focus our discussion on those areas that we feel need addressing in future work, 
and make suggestions as to some experiments to deal with them. First, we describe why we 
feel much of the data speak only weakly to the question of Relativity. 
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 4.1. How do people solve the tasks?  
Some have held that for Relativity to be supported there should be a reasonable 
expectation that participants did not engage grammatical gender information strategically. 
This is most clearly an option in tasks where judgments are about sex and are explicit, such as 
Voice Choice and Sex Assignment, but possibly also Similarity, Association and Object-
Name memory Associations. It is therefore important to distinguish between two means of 
arriving at decisions in many of the tasks in this review; one as a result of conceptual change 
as usually hypothesised in Relativity accounts, and another through metalinguistic 
knowledge. Metalinguistic knowledge refers to the influence of the knowledge of a formal 
property of language, such as grammatical gender, on judgments about objects. While both 
processes are interesting, it is Relativity that research in this review was designed to 
investigate. The problem is that the Voice Choice and Sex Assignment tasks upon which the 
bulk of the Support for Relativity apparently rests cannot tell the two apart. 
It might be argued that researchers can simply ask participants how they performed 
the task, and therefore be in a position to rule out a metalinguistic strategy as a result. 
Interestingly, the cases in which participants have been asked how they came to their 
decisions have thrown up mixed results (e.g., Almutrafi, 2015; Kurinski & Sera, 2011; Sato 
& Athanasopoulos, 2018). Particularly convincing evidence for a conscious metalinguistic 
strategy account of Voice Choice performance comes from a study in which 25 out of 30 
participants later admitted to using grammatical gender to guide their responses (Almutrafi, 
2015). However, although it has often been assumed to be so, there is also no a priori reason 
that the use of metalinguistic strategy need be a conscious process at all. Regardless of how it 
might occur, the use of metalinguistic knowledge undermines a reading of results as the 
outcome of conceptual change. 
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Some researchers have pointed out that participants rarely if ever respond in a manner 
that is 100% consistent with biological sex. This seems to argue against a metalinguistic 
strategy (conscious or otherwise) account. However, we cannot know if participants had more 
than one strategy, some more universal (such as masculine for artefacts, feminine for natural 
kinds: Mullen, 1990), and some more idiosyncratic or personal (see for example participants' 
justifications for their choices in Kurinski & Sera, 2011), with different strategies bringing to 
bear at different times throughout the task. The absence of a consistent, 100% effect of 
grammatical gender on task performance therefore does not preclude the possibility that 
metalinguistic strategies might account for some of the effects that were found. 
Is there evidence to support one or other account from the results of the review? Here 
again we run into the logical problem that we cannot tell processes apart. For example, the 
finding that more support came from speakers of two-gendered languages than three-
gendered languages might be seen as weakening metalinguistic strategy accounts, because 
there is no reason to believe Spanish speakers should prefer such strategies over German 
speakers, for example. However, the availability or attractiveness of metalinguistic strategies 
might on the other hand be enhanced where there is a neater one-to-one mapping of 
grammatical gender category and biological sex.  
Another potential criticism of a metalinguistic account rather than Relativity account 
is that in taking the former view one subscribes to an intrinsically negative, prejudicial 
default that effectively renders Relativity empirically impossible to support. Essentially, 
giving a metalinguistic alternative explanation equal weight might set the bar for actual 
conceptual change accounts impossibly high. However, there exists the scope to tighten 
experimental design to guard against alternative, ‘killjoy’ explanations; this review suggests 
that, for the most part, when these measures are in place the likelihood of finding a positive 
result decline. 
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In our view, the most convincing evidence of the potential for metalinguistic strategy 
accounts comes from the results of Property Judgment tasks. Since this task type does not 
incorporate a sex/gender prompt it keeps such information at arm’s length. The very low rate 
of only 3% Support from this task type might therefore reflect the absence of such strategies 
in performance. 
Overall, the Voice Choice and Sex Assignment paradigms are the most susceptible to 
alternative explanations and further research using these tasks without serious modification is 
unlikely to reveal more about Relativity. Since these tasks are the most common in the field, 
and similar objections can be raised against other task types like Similarity, Object-Name 
Memory Associations and Associations, the pool of information from which we can make the 
most meaningful inferences about the research question is likely to be small. It is for this 
reason that we feel the case for grammatical gender influencing concepts is currently difficult 
to weigh up, and awaits future research (see also section 4.3 below). 
  
4.2. Language on language or language on concepts? 
The process of judging whether a task incorporates language is a difficult one. For 
example, in a Voice Choice or Sex Assignment task participants are sometimes only required 
to produce a single word: ‘male’, ‘female’, ‘boy’, etc. They might only need to circle a letter 
M or F on a sheet of paper. Does this constitute a language process that might inadvertently 
recruit grammatical gender itself? What of the role of the instructions of the task, which are 
linguistic, in formulating a linguistic process to arrive at a response? For almost all the tasks 
in the field, even language processing of the more conspicuous kind is unavoidable, such as 
when making judgments based on linguistic stimuli in the EAST, or thinking of adjectives to 
describe pictures in Properties judgments. For some, linguistic relativity research using solely 
behavioural measures (response times and related patterns) is always susceptible to linguistic 
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processes (e.g., Gleitman & Papafragou, 2013), and it is for this reason that some now 
advocate primarily neurophysiological approaches (Thierry, 2016).  
The argument that language needs to be controlled in Relativity research is usually 
attributed to the thinking for speaking argument (Slobin, 1996), which was originally based 
on the idea that languages require speakers to attend to certain aspects of a scene, such as 
temporal and spatial details, depending on what information their language required (see also 
Slobin, 2003). Slobin later also conceived of ‘thinking for comprehending’, by which the 
languages we speak also influence the way that we think about what we comprehend (Slobin, 
2003). Such a view could mean that tasks which present participants with words will also be 
subject to the restrictions of thinking for speaking, as might tasks that use words about gender 
or sex in their instructions. This would likely encompass almost all the tasks in this review. 
In the tasks in this review, participants did not need to produce the actual nouns for 
the target items themselves in their response. There are some data from the review that we 
can bring to bear on this question, though it is not conclusive. The thinking for speaking 
theory predicts that effects of language on thought might not extend to performance outside 
of the language in which such effects are sourced. Translated into grammatical gender 
research, effects should therefore be strongest when performing in a gendered than in a non-
gendered language context. This was not the case, though only by a very subtle margin (29% 
to 32%). However, given the fact that 83% of samples performed in a gendered language 
context, it is also possible that further data from research employing an ungendered context 
might lead to a change in this outcome, either in favour of or against thinking for speaking. 
It is difficult to know where to draw the line between High and Low language content. 
We classified all but two papers (Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003; Sato & Athanasopoulos, 
2018), involving only 133 samples in all, as Low in language content. It could therefore be 
argued that almost the entirety of the research in the review could be testing for an influence 
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of language on language. We ourselves do not make this claim; this is almost certainly too 
strong a conclusion to draw given the heterogeneity of task designs. In its broadest sense, the 
philosophical debate around the involvement of language in behaviour is beyond the remit of 
this review. More practically, however, we believe it difficult to argue that the tasks 
described in this review vary enough in their language content to allow meaningful 
comparisons along this dimension. 
 
4.3. Practical suggestions for future research 
We divide our suggestions for future research into two sections, in order of 
importance. Firstly, we point out that the results of the review support the possibility that 
there may be a fundamental flaw in the use of grammatical gender as a tool to speak to the 
question of Relativity at all. Secondly, we make the case that if grammatical gender can 
provide an insight, then future tasks would benefit from an overhaul in order to better control 
for alternative explanations. 
 
4.3.1. Returning to the question of: what is ‘gendered’ about grammatical gender? 
The results of the review make the case that effects of grammatical gender are for the 
most part predicted by parameter settings that would be consistent with a statistical 
association account, at least as well as by a conceptual change view of Relativity. This is 
because most settings that promote the association between biological sex and grammatical 
gender enhance the probability that effects are found.  
That Relativity is scaffolded by associations between language and thought, rather 
than language as thought, is a view that is partially consistent with contemporary thought in 
the field, such as the label-feedback hypothesis (Lupyan, 2012) and its offshoot the structural 
feedback hypothesis (Sato & Athanasopoulos, 2018). These theories contend that labels or 
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grammatical information hone attention to associated features which in turn feed back down 
to lower-level processes in a feedback loop. These effects can be up-regulated or down-
regulated by the salience of the relevant linguistic information in the task. The results of the 
review, as well as results from studies in which participants are briefly trained in invented or 
real languages and come to behave in line with those languages (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; 
Casasanto, 2010; Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003), suggest that this is indeed the case. However, 
where a statistical association account departs from these accounts is that the latter allow for 
some degree of change at the conceptual level but a statistical association account does not. A 
statistical association account would predict that if an Italian speaker is processing the target 
‘bed’ in the context of gender/sex, for example, then the concept of masculinity might receive 
activation by an association rather than by any lasting conceptual rub-off. This would be 
similar, for example, to the statistical association between the concepts of sunshine and ice-
cream; we would be unlikely to conceive of sunshine as being similar to ice cream. Put 
simply, a statistical association account need not require conceptual change, especially long-
lived change, to occur at all, and would therefore be incompatible with the spirit of Relativity 
in any of its theoretical incarnations. 
As we stated in our Introduction, this review is not in a position to make such a 
distinction between Relativity and its alternatives, in part because more data is required, but 
also because our review did not find enough unambiguous support for Relativity to 
discriminate between possibilities. For example, it is difficult to assess positive results from 
Voice Choice and Sex Assignment in the light of the hierarchical taxonomy of Relativity 
accounts by Wolff and Holmes (2011), which ranges from the strongest form of Relativity 
(thought is language) through to subtler effects such as ‘language as spotlight’, when a non-
Relativistic account is at least as likely an explanation for the results from such tasks. Instead, 
our review is in a position to weigh up the size of the problem in relating much grammatical 
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gender research to Relativity at all, in any of its forms. Of the five principal parameter 
settings that a statistical association account would predict, one (language content) was 
impossible to draw meaningful inferences from; three (target type, number of gender 
categories, salience of sex/gender) resulted in higher overall rates of Support, and only one 
(gendered language context) was equivocal. It is perhaps important to note that this latter 
parameter did not run powerfully in the opposite direction to what a statistical association 
account would predict; there was only a -3% Support rate difference, far smaller than the next 
smallest difference of +23%, which was instead in favour of the account. The sixth 
parameter—Age—was also equivocal, but less important for the account in any case. We 
therefore interpret these results as framing and underlining the case for a statistical 
association account, by which arbitrary labels for grammatical classes interact with arbitrary 
assignments of nouns to those classes, under conditions that facilitate their association. This 
is not to imply that we prefer such an account, or to rule out the possibility that multiple 
factors might have simultaneous and additive effects. It does imply, however, that 
grammatical gender is presently a foggier lens through which to inspect the case for 
Relativity than the domains of categorical perception, space or time, to name a few.  
As a first step, it would be useful to establish whether ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ are 
psychologically privileged ‘attractor’ concepts that impose their status on other objects in 
their grammatical class, or whether these metalinguistic labels are themselves arbitrary. This 
is important because it would help researchers to understand whether the idea of a 
relationship between grammatical ‘gender’ and biological sex has any psychological reality. 
If it does, then it becomes more likely that members of a class are in some sense imbued with 
this conceptual relationship, and the case for conceptual change accounts would be enhanced. 
There is already a study that suggests a method by which to test this. In one 
experiment not included in this review because it involved invented languages, native English 
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speakers were taught ‘Gumbuzi’, an artificial language with two artificial grammatical 
‘gender’ groups labelled ‘soupative’ and ‘oosative’ (Phillips & Boroditsky, 2003). 
Participants were taught ten items in each group, six of which were inanimate objects, the 
remaining four humans who were either all female or all male. After learning which items 
were assigned to which category, participants rated the similarity of human-object pairs both 
within and across the two groups. The results found that pairs from the same group were 
rated as more similar than items from different groups, leading the authors to conclude that 
there can be a causative (i.e. learned) relationship between grammatical gender and people’s 
conceptualisations of objects.  
Since 40% of all the items in a group were humans of the same biological sex, the 
groups were strongly biased towards sex/gender regardless of the labels ‘soupative’ and 
‘oosative’. It is also likely that the participants were aware of such things as grammatical 
gender categories through formal second language instruction in schools, knowledge of 
which they may have applied to the task. Additionally, the labels ‘oosative’ and ‘soupative’ 
fail to actually describe any of the items within each group; real grammatical gender 
categories are at least partially correlated with the biological sex of its members. 
Nevertheless, this study provides a template for a future study that might teach one group of 
participants that groups are called masculine and feminine, and another group that the groups 
are named after another and equally-represented natural kind. If the arbitrary labelling of the 
classifiers themselves drives performance, then the results of similarity ratings should pattern 
in line with other labels at least as much as they would with masculine and feminine. This 
would suggest that any influence of grammatical gender is a human-made one that is 
independent of linguistic structure and lacking in psychological reality, undermining the 
notion of a conceptual relationship between grammatical gender and biological sex, and in 
turn favouring a statistical association relationship. 
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4.3.2. Dulling Occam’s razor. 
 If grammatical gender is not merely a cultural label, then we follow Ramos and 
Roberson (2011) and others who suggest that studies be conducted that aim to restrict both 
gender and language to as oblique a role as possible. Property Judgment tasks do the former 
very well, but language remains fundamental, and in any case the evidence from these tasks 
is to date overwhelmingly negative. Instead, the Priming tasks by Sato and Athanasopoulos 
(2018) would seem strong candidates for future investigations. In their first experiment, 
French-English participants were found to be slower to indicate whether two objects were 
associated with a male or female face when the grammatical gender of those objects was 
incongruent with the biological sex of the person. In a second experiment participants 
matched one of two trait words (e.g., ‘charming’, ‘realistic’) to a now genderless face after 
being primed with a pair of objects, such as a tie and a spade. Results again pointed to an 
influence of the grammatical gender of the objects in French-English bilinguals’ choices. 
These studies, while not eliminating biological sex and language altogether, keeps some 
distance between these and participants’ actual responses because associations come from the 
task irrelevant grammatical gender of objects that participants are presented with earlier. 
Future work might find a way of making this distance greater still, and include direct 
statistical comparisons between speakers of a gendered language and speakers of a non-
gendered language in order to establish more clearly that any effects are attributable to 
grammatical gender specifically7.  
 
                                               
7 These studies also tested Monolingual English speakers but the pertinent analyses were 
within-group. 
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4.4. Limitations 
This review represents, to the best of our knowledge, the first systematic attempt to 
assess the literature in a quantitative manner. The heterogeneity of methods and their uneven 
representation in the literature presented us with a difficult decision; to group together 
research of different types, or to provide a finer-grained picture. We took the view that it was 
better in a first review to provide a nuanced picture that takes into account differences 
between, for example, instructing participants to assign a voice to an object or a sex to an 
object. This does have the drawback of making it harder to make reliable inferences based on 
less well-used tasks, in particular Object-Name memory associations, Association tasks, and 
Similarity tasks. On the other hand, it makes it easier for later work to be incorporated into 
future reviews. 
A more difficult and subjective issue concerns the interpretation of results classified 
as offering Mixed Support. The argument for the inclusion of this category is to our minds 
quite compelling. If we take for example the finding that training in Spanish improves the 
rate at which Voice Choices are consistent with grammatical gender but nevertheless fails to 
raise this rate above chance (Kurinski & Sera, 2011), neither an entirely cautious approach 
(i.e. this result finds no support for Relativity) nor an endorsement (Voice Choices are 
consistent with grammatical gender) naturally follow, and the need for a third category 
becomes clear. In order to present as objective a view as possible, we have for the most part 
focussed on the rate of Support in the first instance, and the rate of No Support second, and 
Mixed Support only where it is necessary, such as in conditions where there is little data 
either side of this middle category.  
 
5. Conclusion 
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In conclusion, our review found that support for an influence of grammatical gender 
on concepts is strongly task- and context-dependent. Support also comes for the most part 
from tasks that are susceptible to clear alternative explanations. Perhaps most importantly, it 
needs to be empirically established that grammatical gender itself is not a cultural label but a 
concept with psychological reality before any influence can be reasonably attributed to truly 
linguistic processes. 
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